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Sharp  fluctuations  in  cyclical  conditions  observed  in  industrial  and  developing 
countries  alike  have  renewed  the  debate  on  the  scope  and  the  effectiveness  of 
stabilization policies. Traditionally it has been argued that developing countries are 
unable  to  adopt  counter-cyclical  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  due  to  financial 
imperfections  and  unfavorable  political-economy  conditions.  We  claim  that 
developing  countries  with  institutional  features  similar  to  those  of  industrial 
countries are able to conduct counter-cyclical policies. Using a world sample of 
115 industrial and developing countries for 1984-2008, we find that the level of 
institutional quality plays a key role in countries’ ability to implement counter-
cyclical  macroeconomic  policies.  The  results  show  that  countries  with  strong 
(weak) institutions adopt counter- (pro-) cyclical macroeconomic policies, reflected 
in  extended  monetary  policy  and  fiscal  policy  rules.  The  threshold  level  of 
institutional quality at which macroeconomic policy is neutral to the business cycle 
is higher for fiscal policy than for monetary policy. The sensitivity of fiscal policy 
cyclicality to institutional quality is larger than is the case of monetary policy. 
 
Key Words: Counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies, institutions, fiscal policy, 
monetary policy. 
 
JEL Classification: E43, E52, E62  
 
 
*  We  thank  seminar  participants  at  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  the  World  Bank,  the 
European Central Bank, the Annual Meetings of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic 
Association, the Annual Meetings of the Chilean Economic Society, and the Workshop for 
Young Economists at UDEP (Lima) for helpful comments. We are also indebted to Alberto 
Humala  and  an  anonymous  referee  for  very  valuable  comments  and  suggestions.  Schmidt-
Hebbel gratefully acknowledges financial support provided by Fondecyt research project No. 
1060175. 
 
**   email: ccalderon@worldbank.org    ***   email: duncantaraba@wisc.edu   
**** email: kschmidt-hebbel@faceapuc.cl    1 
1. Introduction 
Macroeconomic policies are geared in principle toward stabilizing business-cycle 
fluctuations. There is evidence of the ability of industrial economies to conduct counter-
cyclical  fiscal  policies (Lane, 2003a, b; Kaminsky, Reinhart,  and Végh, 2004; Alesina, 
Campante,  and  Tabellini,  2008;  Ilzetzki,  2007).  Fiscal  policies  have  been  found  to  be 
counter-cyclical  in  Europe  (Melitz,  2000)  and  their  degree  of  counter-cyclicality  has 
strengthened after signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact by 
European Union members (Gali and Perotti, 2002). Central banks in OECD economies 
usually  implement  counter-cyclical  monetary  policies,  as  documented  widely  by 
estimations  of  different  versions  of  monetary  policy  or  Taylor  rules  (e.g.,  Sack  and 
Wieland, 2007; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007). The fiscal and monetary policy response in 
most  OECD  countries  to  the  2008-09  global  financial  crisis  and  recession  has  been 
exceptionally strong, combining large discretionary fiscal packages, very low interest rates, 
and unorthodox monetary and credit easing (IMF 2009, OECD 2009). 
However,  in  contrast  to  industrial  economies,  the  cyclical  properties  of 
macroeconomic policies in developing economies are more disputed. In fact, it has often 
been argued that developing countries are unable to adopt counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
policies. Earlier research suggests that monetary and fiscal policies are predominantly pro-
cyclical, both in Latin America and other developing regions (Hausmann and Stein, 1996; 
Gavin and Perotti, 1997a; Gavin and Hausmann, 1998; Talvi and Végh, 2005; Lane, 2003a; 
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004). 
Pro-cyclical  policies  are  conducted  by  governments  that  cut  taxes  and  increase 
spending  and  by  central  banks  that  relax  monetary  policy  during  booms,  while  both 
governments and central banks adopt contractionary policies during busts. What drives this 
de-stabilizing policy behavior? 
It has been argued that the ability of developing countries to adopt optimal (counter-
cyclical) stabilization policies is hampered by external borrowing constraints (Gavin and 
Perotti,  1997b;  Calvo  and Reinhart,  2000), fragile domestic financial systems and high 
levels of foreign-currency denominated liabilities (Riascos and Végh, 2003; Lane, 2003a), 
interactions between domestic and external financial imperfections (á la Caballero, 2002,   2 
and  Caballero  and  Krishnamurty,  2001a,  b),  and  lack  of  financial  integration  (Yakhin, 
2008).  
Further hindrances to adopt stabilizing policies are attributed to political-economy 
constraints.  Pro-cyclical  stop-and-go  policies  are  intensified  when  fiscal  and  monetary 
institutions are weak, resulting in pro-cyclical policy rules and low policy credibility (Lane, 
2003a; Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003). Pro-cyclical fiscal policies are more intense 
in countries with political systems with multiple fiscal veto points and high macroeconomic 
volatility (Stein et al., 1998; Talvi and Végh, 2005; Braun, 2001). Pro-cyclical monetary 
policies  are  pursued  when  central  banks  lack  credibility  (Calvo  and  Reinhart,  2002; 
Mendoza, 2002). 
  Recent theoretical research has provided further insights on the pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal  policies.  Alesina,  Campante,  and  Tabellini  (2008)  develop  a  model  in  which 
democratic governments extract rents through direct appropriation of tax revenues or the 
servicing  of  special  interest  groups,  and  voters  are  unable  to  observe  government 
borrowing. The interaction between the agency problem and voters’ imperfect information 
leads to demands for lower taxes or more public goods by voters during expansions, thus 
forcing  authorities  to  pursue  pro-cyclical,  myopic  fiscal  policies.  Hence  fiscal  pro-
cyclicality  is  a  second-best  solution  to  distortions  caused  by  corruption  and  imperfect 
information. Ilzetzki (2007) extends the latter model to all types of governments (including 
non-democracies),  combining  rent-extracting  governments,  counter-cyclical  spending  on 
public goods, and an inverse correlation between rent seeking and public-goods spending. 
Hence pro-cyclical government spending (or pro-cyclical fiscal policy) results whenever 
rent-seeking motivations are sufficiently strong. 
  The two latter studies also provide international evidence on fiscal policy cyclicality 
for a large number of countries, roughly spanning from the 1960s through 2000. Alesina, 
Campante,  and  Tabellini’s  panel  correlations  between  the  output  gap  and  government 
expenditure are negative (positive) for OECD (non-OECD) economies, and between the 
output gap and the  government  surplus  are positive (negative) for OECD (non-OECD) 
economies.  Ilzetzki’s  simple  cross-section  correlation  between  government  expenditure 
cyclicality and GDP per capita reflects counter-cyclical (pro-cyclical) expenditure levels in 
high-income  (low  and  middle-income)  economies,  and  between  government  surplus   3 
cyclicality and GDP per capita reflects pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) surpluses in high-
income (low-income) countries. Using multivariate econometric estimations, both studies 
find evidence that corruption (as proxy for rent-seeking behavior) contributes significantly 
to fiscal pro-cyclicality in the world. 
Analytical  underpinnings  of  monetary  policy  pro-cyclicality  are  developed  by 
Duncan  (2010).  In  a  model  with  foreign  investors  that  face  a  probability  of  partial 
confiscation, which works as a proxy of institutional quality, a lower level of institutional 
quality  reduces  the  country’s  foreign  demand  for  external  liabilities.  This  implies  that, 
when there is a positive external demand shock, the reduction in the value of foreign debt 
caused by the real exchange-rate appreciation is smaller. Given this low wealth effect, the 
real appreciation leads to lower consumption and higher labor supply. Wages drop and 
inflation declines. The central bank reacts by cutting its policy rate to stabilize inflation, 
thus adopting a pro-cyclical policy stance. The net result is a negative link between the 
policy rate and output or, more generally, a lower correlation between the latter variables 
compared to countries with high-quality institutions. 
  Taylor (2000) extends his monetary-policy rule to assess the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy, specifying a simple fiscal rule in which the budget surplus is driven by the output 
gap. Chadha and Nolan (2007) derive optimal simple monetary and fiscal rules  from a 
general-equilibrium model. Taylor (2000) and Chadha and Nolan (2007) show that simple 
policy rules match quite well U.S. monetary and fiscal policies during the last decades, and 
the latter authors also provide similar evidence for the United Kingdom.     
In  contrast  to  most  of  the  views  presented  above  on  fiscal  and  monetary  pro-
cyclicality in developing economies, our prior —to be tested here— is that macroeconomic 
policies  play  a  key  role  in  stabilizing  business-cycle  fluctuations  in  any  economies—
industrial or developing— where institutions are stronger. Among developing economies, 
for example Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand adopted expansionary policies during 2001-
2003,  a  period  of  cyclical  weakness  in  these  economies.  More  recently,  Brazil,  Chile, 
China,  India,  and  Mexico  were  among  many  developing  countries  that  adopted 
expansionary policies in response to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and subsequent 
domestic cyclical weakness.    4 
We argue that differences in the cyclical stance of macroeconomic policy in the 
global  economy  –  hence  across  both  industrial  and  developing  countries  –  may  be 
attributed  to  differences  in  their  levels  of  institutional  quality.  Developing  economies 
comprise  a  highly  heterogeneous  country  group  that  exhibits  large  differences  in 
government stability, socioeconomic conditions, law and order, bureaucratic quality, and 
corruption,  among  other  measures  of  institutional  quality,  which  may  explain  cyclical 
properties of their macroeconomic policies. 
The  main  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  test  this  proposition  by  using  measures  of 
institutional  quality  as  key  determinants  of  the  cyclicality  of  both  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies  in  industrial  and  developing  economies.  We  expect  that  countries  with  weak 
institutions  will not  be able to  pursue counter-cyclical  policies. On the other hand,  we 
anticipate that countries with strong institutions apply contractionary policies during booms 
and expansionary policies during recessions —i.e., they are able to pursue counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies. We will test empirically our hypothesis using large panel data sets 
of up to 112 countries with annual data for 25 years.  
This  paper  extends  previous  empirical  work  (discussed  above),  which  has  been 
mainly on fiscal policy, by focusing symmetrically on both fiscal and monetary policy. 
Moreover, our specification for fiscal and monetary policy cyclicality is based on extending 
standard policy rules found in the literature on monetary policy or Taylor rules (Taylor, 
1993a, b; 1995; 2000), fiscal policy rules (Braun, 2001; Lane, 2003b; Taylor 2000) or both 
(Taylor, 2000; Chadha and Nolan 2007), by considering the interaction between the cycle 
and institutional development. The focus of this paper is on the role of a broad measure of 
institutional quality —that includes corruption among many other components— as a key 
determinant  of  policy  makers’  abilities  to  adopt  counter-cyclical  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies. We also extend significantly previous work on the role of fiscal policy credibility 
(proxied by country-risk premiums on sovereign debt) in the cyclical properties of policies 
in 10 developing economies (Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003, and Calderón, Duncan, 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2004). 
The empirical research in this paper is conducted over a large panel sample ranging 
from 1420 (for monetary policy) up to 2381 country-year observations (for fiscal policy).   5 
Our robustness tests comprise empirical searches over alternative measures of dependent 
and independent variables, and different estimation techniques. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the data to be 
used  and  stylized  facts  about  the  cross-country  relation  between  policy  cyclicality  and 
institutional quality. Then we present a model for extended monetary and fiscal policy rules 
and  discuss  our  empirical  strategy  to  assess  the  relationship  between  the  quality  of 
institutions and the cyclical stance of their macroeconomic policies. We report the panel 
data evidence for our world sample in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Stylized Facts 
  This section describes briefly the definition and sources of the data used in our 
empirical  analysis.
1  Then, as a first  step in  our empirical assessment, we report some 
stylized facts on the relationship between  macroeconomic policies and institutions found in 
the world sample. A more detailed description of data sources and construction is provided 
in the Data Appendix. 
  We have collected annual data  of measures of monetary policy, fiscal policy,  real 
output, exchange rates, and institutions for a world sample of industrial  and developing 
countries. The lack of  reliability or availability of data for at least 10 consecutive years 
restricts  our  country  samples  to:  (a)  84  countries  for  the  1984 -2007  period,  for  our 
monetary policy regressions, and (b) 112 countries for the 1984-2008 period, for our fiscal 
policy regressions.
2 
3 Table 1 reports the list of 115 countries used at least once in our two 
sets of regressions. 
  The monetary policy variable in this paper is the interest rate relevant for monetary 
policy. For most countries we use the central bank’s discount rate. When the latter is not 
available, we use the money market or interbank interest rate. The dependent variable in 
                                                            
1 Our data base and estimation output are available on request. 
2  For  the  monetary (fiscal)  policy equation, the  country  distribution is  23 (23)  industrial and  61 (89) 
developing countries. The regional distribution of developing countries is 18 (22) from Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 10 (11) from East Asia and the Pacific,  4 (4) from South Asia, 11 (13) from Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, 8 (16) from the Middle East and North Africa, and 10 (23) from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
3 The sample size for our monetary policy regressions is sign ificantly smaller because we exclude those 
country-years where monetary independence is fully absent because  countries  have relinquished use of a 
national or common currency.   For identifying hard-peg country-years, we  follow  Ilzetzky, Reinhart, and 
Rogoff (2009), who identify unilateral currency unions (e.g., official dollarizations in Ecuador or El Salvador) 
and currency boards (e.g., Estonia and Hong Kong).     6 
our estimations is our estimate of the cyclical component of monetary policy, defined as the 
log deviation of the gross nominal interest rate from its gross estimated long-run value. The 
fiscal  policy  indicator  in  this  paper  is  real  government  expenditure,  as  suggested  by 
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004).
4 The dependent variable in our estimations is  our 
estimate of  the cyclical component of  fiscal policy, defined as the log deviation of  real 
public expenditure from its estimated long-run value.  
  Our real output  measure  is GDP and its cyclical component is the output gap 
defined as the log deviation  of real GDP  from its estimated long -run value.  Domestic 
inflation is the log of the ratio of the current to the lagged consumer price index and its 
deviation is defined from its estimated long -run value. Domestic currency depreciation is 
the log of the ratio of the current to the lagged nominal exchange rate and its deviation is 
defined from its estimated long-run value. Long-run estimates for all relevant variables are 
obtained by de-trending the corresponding series using either the Hodrick-Prescott filter or 
the first-difference filter. 
  Institutional quality is measured by the  index of the International Country Risk 
Guide (which we denote as the ICRG index), published by the Political Risk Services 
(PRS) Group. The ICRG index, available for our full sample period, considers a wide array 
of institutional features, of which only one is corruption (used by Alesina, Campante, and 
Tabellini, 2008 and by Ilzetzki 2007 as their main political-economy determinant of fiscal-
policy pro-cyclicality). The  aggregate ICRG index  is the  sum of 12 partial measures of 
institutional  quality:  (a)  Government  Stability  (with  a  maximum  of  12  points),  (b) 
Socioeconomic Conditions (12 points), (c) Investment Profile (12 points), (d) Internal 
Conflict (12 points), (e) External Conflict (12 points), (f) Corruption (6 points), (g) Military 
in Politics (6 points), (h) Religious Tensions (6 points), (i) Law and Order (6 points), (j) 
Ethnic Tensions (6 points), (k) Democratic Accountability (6 points), and (l) Bureaucracy 
Quality (4 points). Therefore, the ICRG index ranges from 0 (lowest level of institutional 
quality) to 100 (highest level). 
                                                            
4  Considering  that  the  automatic  stabilizing  component  of  government  revenue  (taxes)  is  much  more  
significant than that of government expenditure, we follow the latter authors in using government expenditure 
as our fiscal policy indicator, as it is  a better indicator of discretionary fiscal policy than the government 
surplus.   7 
  Table 1 reports summary statistics for each country’s ICRG index. For our panel, 
the full panel sample average is 65.8 points, a value close to the time-series sample mean of 
Brazil (65.9), China (66.0), Mongolia (66.1), or Uruguay (67.7). The highest country-year 
score is 97 (Switzerland, 1984) and the lowest is 21.8 (Ethiopia, 1992). 
  We  depict  the  unconditional  cross-country  relationship  between  the  cyclical 
behavior of macroeconomic policies and the quality  of institutions  in Figures  1 and 2. 
Figure  1  shows  the  statistically  significant  link  between  the  degree  of  cyclicality  of 
monetary  policy  —the  correlation  between  the  cyclical  stance  of  monetary  policy 
(measured by the interest rate deviation from its long-run value) and the output gap
5— and 
the average quality of institutions measured by the ICRG Index.
6 According to this cross-
country evidence, there is a positive link between countries with better institutions (a higher 
average  ICRG index) and their ability to perform counter -cyclical monetary policy (a 
higher correlation between the interest rate deviation and the output gap).  
  Figure 2 illustrates a similar link between the degree of fiscal policy cyclicality and 
institutional quality in our cross -country sample.  This  relationship is  also  statistically 
significant. As expected, the correlation between  the cyclical component of  government 
spending and the output gap tends to fall as the quality of institutions rises. Therefore the 
ability of governments to use spending as a counter -cyclical fiscal tool is enhanced as the 
quality of institutions improves. 
  In sum, our cross-country scatter plots provides preliminary suggestive evidence in 
support of our hypotheses. However, the latter unconditional correlations do not represent 
conclusive evidence due to several specification and estimation problems that can only be 
addressed in a full multivariate specification subject to formal testing. This is our next task. 
3.  Model and Empirical Strategy 
We begin by introducing the empirical model and the strategy to test for the cyclical 
properties of monetary and fiscal policies in the panel sample. Monetary policy is specified 
as an extension of the standard policy or Taylor rule. In addition to standard monetary rule 
determinants (the lagged dependent variable, the inflation deviation, and the output gap), 
                                                            
5  This is the correlation   for the full sample period covering 1984 -2007. The output gap is the cyclical 
component of actual output obtained from de -trended real GDP based on the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) 
filter.   8 
we  include  the  exchange-rate  depreciation  as  an  additional  regressor,  as  validated  in 
empirical studies for several developing and industrial countries.
7 Fiscal policy follows a 
similar specification but omitting the inflation deviation  and exchange-rate depreciation 
terms (similar to Taylor 2000). 
Regarding our  main  hypothesis, we introduce  an interaction term between the 
business-cycle variable (the output gap) and the measure institutional quality in both policy 
equations. At high levels of institutional quality (i.e. higher values of the ICRG index), we 
expect  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  to  be  counter -cyclical.  Therefore  we  specify  the 
following structural equations for the cyclical stance of monetary and fiscal policy: 
 
t , i t , i t , i 5 t , i 4 t , i 3 t , i 2 1 t , i 1 0 t , i u Q y ~ α y ~ α e ~ α π ~ α r ~ α α r ~          (1) 
 
t , i t , i t , i 3 t , i 2 1 t , i 1 0 t , i v Q y ~ β y ~ β g ~ β β g ~              (2) 
 
where r ~is  the  deviation  of  the  nominal  interest  rate  from  its  long-run  level,  π ~   is  the 
deviation  of  domestic  inflation  from  its  long-run  level,  e ~  is  the  deviation  of  currency 
depreciation from its long-run level,  y ~  is the output gap or business cycle measure, defined 
as the deviation of real GDP from its long-run level, g ~  is the deviation of real government 
spending from its long-run level, and Q is the ICRG measure of institutional quality. The 
terms u and v are stochastic disturbances and subscripts i and t denote the country and the 
time period, respectively. 
Regarding our control variables, we expect the (absolute value of) coefficients of 
the lagged dependent variables, α1 and  1, to lie between 0 and 1, and both coefficients α2 
(for the inflation rate) and α3 (for the currency depreciation rate) in the monetary policy 
equation to be positive. The latter coefficient reflects central bank attempts to smoothen 
exchange-rate  fluctuations  by  using  their  monetary  policy  instrument,  a  practice  often 
observed in developing countries but infrequently in industrial economies. Hence we will 
exclude the exchange-rate depreciation deviation in our base regressions but include it in an 
alternative set of regressions to test for robustness of our base results. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 Newey-West HAC corrected standard errors are reported below each coefficient value of figures 1 and 2. 
7 For industrial countries, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) find that monetary policy in Canada and the UK 
reacts in response to exchange-rate movements while it does not in Australia and New Zealand.   9 
  We  reported  in  section  2  unconditional  estimates  of  cross-country  correlations 
between policy cyclicality and the quality of institutions, shown in Figures 1 and 2. The 
model introduced in this section allows for estimation of conditional measures of policy 
cyclicality in full panel samples, controlling for other policy determinants in the context of 
behavioral equations. The latter measures are the coefficient estimates that reflect our main 
hypothesis. For monetary policy (equation 1), coefficients α4 and  5 should be negative and 
positive,  respectively,  and  statistically  significant.  At  high  (low)  levels  of  institutional 
quality  –a  high  (low)  value  of  the  ICRG  index–  we  anticipate  monetary  policy  to  be 
counter-  (pro-)  cyclical.  For  fiscal  policy,  2  and  3  should  be  positive  and  negative, 
respectively, and statistically significant. At high (low) levels of quality of institutions, we 
expect fiscal policy to be counter- (pro-) cyclical. 
The specification also allows for calculation of the threshold level of institutional 
quality that is associated with a neutral or a-cyclical policy stance —i.e. a threshold level at 
which policy is neither counter- nor pro-cyclical.
8 The threshold level is obtained simply by 
dividing the negative of the output gap coef ficient by the interaction term coefficient, a 
result of setting the partial derivative of the policy rule to the output gap to zero. In the case 
of monetary policy equation (1), the institutional quality threshold,  Q*, is given by the 
following condition: 
 




t , i 5 4
t , i
t , i
                  (3) 
 
Our  estimate  of  Q*  is  the  threshold  value  of  institutional  quality  that  countries 
would exceed when they adopt counter-cyclical policies; otherwise they would engage in 
pro-cyclical policies. It is straightforward to infer the cyclical position of monetary policy, 
dependent  on  the  observed  level  of  the  institutional  quality  index  Q,  from  the  latter 
expression: 
 
                                                            
8 If  4 and  5 are not statistically significant we can also conclude that monetary policy is a-cyclical. A 
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As shown in equation (3), Q*  is determined by the coefficient estimates of our 
monetary policy equation. Therefore the latter estimates  —and hence Q*— are sample-
specific.  Below  we  will  compare  the  difference  between  our  Q*  estimates  and  actual 
country Q levels in order to infer about the cyclical properties of macroeconomic policies at 
the country level. We will derive an analogous threshold level Q* value from coefficient 
estimates of equation (2) for fiscal policy. 
We use the GMM-IV estimator for dynamic panel data models (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) as our main estimation method. This estimator controls for possible endogeneity of 
regressors and  avoids biased and inconsistent  estimators.
9 To verify the validity of the 
moment conditions specified by our GMM -IV estimator, we perform the  Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of instruments by analyzing the 
sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. If we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that the conditions hold, we validate our specified regression model.  
We test the sensitivity of our results by performing alternative estimations along the 
following dimensions. First, we report OLS pooled estimation results before turning to our 
main results based on the GMM-IV estimator. 
  Second, we use alternative measures  for our dependent variables in the monetary 
policy  and  fiscal  policy  equation s.  We  derive  two  different  measures  for  the  policy 
deviations from their long-run levels. The first measure is based on  the deviation of the 
interest rate  (or government spending)  from its stochastic trend obtained by using the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The second is derived by  applying first differences to the 
interest rate (or government spending). 
                                                            
9 We use lags of the dependent variable and the regressors as instruments.   11 
  Third, we use three alternative sets of instrumental variables (IV) for both monetary 
and fiscal policy equations. IV sets are comprised by lagged regressors such that IV Set 1 is 
a subset of IV Set 2, and the latter is a subset of IV Set 3 (see also Table 1). For example, 
for our fiscal policy rule, set 1 includes (differenced)  2 t g ~ , 1 t y ~ , 1 t 1 t Q y ~ ,and  2 t 2 t Q y ~ ; set 
2  contains  set  1  and  also  (differenced)  3 t 3 t Q y ~ ;  and  set  3  includes  set  2  and  also 
(differenced)  4 t 4 t Q y ~ . In a similar way, we define the sets of instruments for our monetary 
policy rule. 
  Finally,  we  report  monetary  policy  regression  results  that  include  the  cyclical 
component  of  nominal  exchange-rate  changes,  reflecting  potential  policy  reactions  of 
central banks to large domestic currency shocks. 
 
4. Results 
This section reports estimation results for our monetary and fiscal policy equations 
(1) and (2), based on the world sample of industrial and developing countries for 1984-
2008. We use the regression results for calculating the threshold values of institutional 
quality at which policies are neutral and depict the conditional relationships between policy 
cyclicality and institutional quality. 
 
4.1. Monetary Policy Cyclicality and Institutional Quality 
Table 2 reports ten estimation results for our monetary policy equation. We conduct 
a broad search across different estimation techniques (two pooled OLS and eight GMM-IV 
results), specifications (with and without the currency-depreciation term), and instrument 
sets. Coefficient estimates display expected signs and are statistically significant at standard 
levels. The Sargan test statistic for GMM-IV results confirms that the specification adopted 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance. OLS results are probably affected 
by bias and exhibit generally less significant and robust coefficient estimations than GMM-
IV results. Hence we focus only on the latter. 
Regarding  our  controls,  monetary  policy  follows  an  oscillatory  annual  pattern, 
reflected by negative coefficients of the lagged dependent variable. As expected, inflation 
deviations induce monetary policy reactions of the same sign, with coefficient estimates   12 
ranging from 0.30 to 0.38. Inclusion of exchange-rate deviations as an additional regressor 
(columns 9 and 10, Table 2) suggests that central banks also  respond to exchange-rate 
shocks, although the latter reaction is one order of magnitude smaller than their reaction to 
inflation  shocks.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  inclusion  of  exchange-rate  depreciation 
deviations  lower  the  size  of  inflation  coefficients  but  raise  the  size  of  output-gap 
coefficients. 
Consistent  with  this  paper’s  main  prior,  the  monetary  policy  regression  results 
confirm strongly the existence of a significant relation between monetary policy stance, 
business-cycle conditions (measured by the output gap), and the latter’s interaction with the 
measure of institutional quality. The findings show that monetary policy is significantly 
counter-cyclical in countries that exhibit high levels of institutional quality while policy is 
pro-cyclical where institutions exhibit low quality. This result is robustly reflected by all 
GMM-IV  results,  with  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient  for  the  output  gap  and  a 
positive  and  significant  coefficient  for  the  interaction  term  between  output  gap  and 
institutional  quality.  The  latter  results  allow  to  calculate  our  threshold  levels  at  which 
monetary policy is a-cyclical (Q*), which are close to 74 points when using the HP filter 
for estimating deviations (columns 3-5, Table 2) and close to 65 points when using the first-
difference filter (columns 6-8, Table 2). The GMM-IV estimates for the monetary rule that 
includes exchange-rate shocks (Table 2, columns 9-10) imply obtaining Q* estimates that 
are only slightly smaller than those obtained when exchange arte deviations are excluded. 
The empirical results based on the HP filter (columns 3-6, Table 2) are our preferred 
estimations for three reasons: they are based on a filter which is likely to reflect business 
cycles more properly, they  are based on a larger sample, and coefficients  for inflation 
deviations, the output gap, and the interaction term are  estimated very  precisely.  Their 
range of estimates for Q* is very narrow, lying between 73.6 and 74.8 points. 
In  the  2004-2007  period,  the  latest  expansionary  cycle  in  the  world  economy, 
developing countries that exhibited institutional quality above the latter threshold range 
include  Chile  (80.5),  Croatia  (75.0),  Korea  (75.6),  Malaysia  (76.2),  and  the  Slovak 
Republic (77.0). On the other hand, among the countries that were below the threshold or 
neutral-policy range were Colombia (57.0), Indonesia (56.4), Israel (63.9), and Peru (63.5).  
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4.2. Fiscal Policy Cyclicality and Institutional Quality 
Table 3 summarizes eight empirical results for our fiscal policy specification. As in 
the case of the monetary policy equation, we report results for both OLS and GMM-IV 
estimations, and for different instrument sets. As above, we discuss only the GMM-IV 
results.  The  Sargan  test  verifies  that  the  specification  cannot  be  statistically  rejected. 
Coefficient  estimates  display  expected  signs  and  are  statistically  significant  at  standard 
levels. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and close to 0.17 when 
using the HP filter, and negative and close to -0.10 when using the first-difference filter. 
As in the case of our monetary policy results, and consistent with this paper’s main 
hypothesis,  the  fiscal  policy  regression  results  confirm  strongly  the  existence  of  a 
significant relation between fiscal policy stance, the output gap, and the latter’s interaction 
with  institutional  quality.  The  findings  show  that  fiscal  policy  is  significantly  counter-
cyclical in countries that exhibit high levels of institutional quality while policy is pro-
cyclical where institutions exhibit low quality. This result is robustly reflected by all GMM-
IV results, with a positive and significant coefficient for the output gap and a negative and 
significant coefficient for the interaction term between output gap and institutional quality. 
The corresponding threshold levels of institutional quality (Q*) are close to 83 points when 
using the HP filter for estimating deviations (columns 3-5, Table 3) and close to 86 points 
when using the first-difference filter (columns 6-8, Table 3). For our preferred results based 
on the HP filter the estimated range for Q* narrows down to 82.1-83.5 points. 
  During  the  2004-2008  period,  developing  countries  that  exhibited  institutional 
quality index averages above the latter threshold range include only The Bahamas (85.1). In 
contrast, many industrial countries are in this group, including Australia (87.3), Iceland 
(90.1), and Ireland (89.6). Almost all developing countries fall below the fiscal-policy Q* 
range, including Chile (80.1), Panama (74.3), and Uruguay (71.1). 
 
4.3. Macroeconomic Policy Cyclicality and the Quality of Institutions 
We note that the threshold or neutral policy levels Q* obtained from our GMM-IV 
fiscal policy estimations based on the HP filter (columns 3-5, Table 3), close to 83 points, is 
about  9  points  above  that  obtained  from  the  analogous  monetary  policy  estimations 
(columns 3-5, Table 2), which are close to 74 points. Therefore institutional quality is a   14 
much more stringent constraint in the case of fiscal policy. In other words,  to adopt a 
counter-cyclical  stance  requires  a  higher  degree  of  institutional  development  for  the 
conduct of fiscal policy than in the case of monetary policy. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the response of the stance of macroeconomic policies to 
institutional  quality,  conditional  on  the  influence  of  other  determinants  included  in  the 
policy equations. Using the GMM-IV results reported in columns (3) and (6) of tables 2 and 
3 for the monetary and fiscal policy equations, respectively, we calculate the response of 
macroeconomic policies to the output gap at different levels of institutional quality. For a 
range of institutional quality that spans from the minimum average country value to 100 
points, we set a grid of levels of institutional quality. Then we calculate the cyclical degree 
of macroeconomic policies, conditional on the values of the grid. The corresponding results 
are depicted in figures 3 and 4 for monetary and fiscal policy, respectively. We note three 
comparative results. First, while the relations between policy cyclicality and institutional 
quality based on the HP and first-difference filters differ somewhat for monetary policy, 
they are very close for fiscal policy. Second, as noted above, the Q* threshold level (at 
which the corresponding schedule crosses the horizontal line that marks an a-cyclical policy 
stance in figures 3 and 4) based on HP-filter equation (3), is 75 points for monetary policy, 
well  below  the  83  points  for  fiscal  policy.  Finally,  the  sensitivity  of  monetary  policy 
cyclicality to institutional quality – reflected by the absolute value of the first derivative of 
the policy schedules – is much smaller than is the case of fiscal policy. 
 
5. Conclusions 
There is ample evidence on the ability of industrial economies to conduct counter-
cyclical  fiscal  and  monetary  policies.  In  contrast  to  industrial  economies,  developing 
countries have been found to be unable to adopt counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  ability  of  developing  countries  to  adopt  optimal  (counter-
cyclical)  stabilization  policies  is  hampered  by  external  borrowing  constraints,  fragile 
domestic  financial  systems,  high  levels  of  foreign-currency  denominated  liabilities, 
interactions  between  domestic  and  external  financial  imperfections,  political-economy 
constraints,  lack  of  policy  credibility,  corruption,  and  imperfect  information  about 
government programs.   15 
In  contrast  to  most  of  the  views  presented  before  on  fiscal  and  monetary  pro-
cyclicality in developing economies, this paper’s prior is that macroeconomic policies are 
counter-cyclical in any economy – industrial or developing – where institutions are strong. 
This paper has extended previous empirical work, which has been mainly on fiscal policy, 
by focusing symmetrically on both fiscal and monetary policy. Our specification for fiscal 
and monetary policy cyclicality is based on extending standard policy rules found in the 
literature by considering the interaction between the cycle and institutional development. 
The focus of this paper is on the role of a broad measure of institutional quality —that 
includes  corruption  among  many  other  components—  as  a  key  determinant  of  policy 
makers’ abilities to adopt counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies. 
We have tested empirically our hypothesis using large panel data sets of up to 112 
countries,  with  annual  data  for  the  last  quarter  century  (1984-2008).  Our  GMM-IV 
estimation  results  are  very  supportive  of  our  priors.  Sargan  test  statistics  confirm  that 
specifications cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance while individual 
coefficient  estimates  display  expected  signs  and  are  statistically  significant  at  standard 
levels. Our robustness tests have included empirical searches over alternative measures of 
dependent and independent variables, and different estimation techniques. 
Both our monetary policy and fiscal policy regression results confirm strongly the 
existence  of  a  significant  relation  between  monetary  policy  stance,  business-cycle 
conditions (measured by the output gap), and the latter’s interaction with the measure of 
institutional quality. The findings show that both macroeconomic policies are significantly 
counter-cyclical in countries that exhibit high levels of institutional quality while policies 
are pro-cyclical where institutions exhibit low quality.  
We  have  also  found  that  the  threshold  level  of  institutional  quality  at  which 
macroeconomic policies are neutral to the business cycle differs for monetary and fiscal 
policies. From our preferred regression results we have calculated a threshold value of 
institutional quality at 83 points for fiscal policy, which is about 9 points higher than that 
obtained for monetary policy. Hence to adopt a counter-cyclical stance requires a higher 
degree of institutional development for the conduct of fiscal policy than in the case of 
monetary  policy.  Finally,  the  sensitivity  of  monetary  policy  cyclicality  to  institutional 
quality is found to be much smaller than is the case of fiscal policy.   16 
Data Appendix 
 
Deviation of the nominal interest rate from its long-run level ( r ~): Cyclical component 
of the log of gross nominal central bank’s discount rate. When the discount rate is not 
available, money market or interbank rates are used. Source: International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
Deviation of real government spending from its long-run level (g ~ ): Cyclical component 
of the log of real government spending. Source: national accounts, IFS (IMF). 
 
Output gap (y ~ ): Cyclical component of the log of real GDP. Source: IFS (IMF). 
 
Deviation of domestic inflation rate from its long-run level (π ~ ): Cyclical component of 
the log of the gross CPI inflation rate. Source: IFS (IMF). 
 
Deviation  of  currency  depreciation  rate  from  its  long-run  level  (e ~ ):  Cyclical 
component  of  the  log  of  the  gross  nominal  exchange-rate  depreciation  rate.  Nominal 
exchange rate expressed as the value of the domestic currency per US dollar. For the United 
States, an index constructed on a basket of currencies is used. Source: IFS (IMF). 
 
The cyclical components are obtained from de-trending the variables using the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) first and the first-difference filter. We set the smoothing parameter value of 
the HP filter using the frequency power rule of Ravn and Uhlig (2002). 
 
Institutional Quality: level of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG 
index ranges from 0 (the lowest level of institutional quality) to 100 (the highest level) and 
has  12  components:  (a)  Government  Stability  (with  a  maximum  of  12  points),  (b) 
Socioeconomic  Conditions  (12  points),  (c)  Investment  Profile  (12  points),  (d)  Internal 
Conflict (12 points), (e) External Conflict (12 points), (f) Corruption (6 points), (g) Military 
in Politics (6 points), (h) Religious Tensions (6 points), (i) Law and Order (6 points), (j) 
Ethnic Tensions (6 points), (k) Democratic Accountability (6 points), and (l) Bureaucracy 
Quality (4 points). Source: Political Risk Service (PRS) Group. The ICRG index is reported 
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Figure 1. Output - Interest Rate Correlation and ICRG Average
Corr(y,r) = -0.929 + 0.015 Mean(ICRG)



















































Figure 2. Output - Government Spending Correlation and ICRG Average
Corr(y,g) = 0.642 - 0.007 Mean(ICRG)
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Figure 4. Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policies 
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